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THE USE OF THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX
SYSTEM TO COMBAT AIR AND WATER





During the past few years there has been a proliferation in the
number of proposed methods of providing financial assistance for
combatting air and water pollution. Included are proposals for direct
federal grants,' federal low-interest loans,' effluent fees,' and special
financing techniques for municipal treatment facilities' and river basin
authorities.° There have also been many suggestions that the federal
income tax system be utilized to aid antipollution efforts. These pro-
posals usually take the form of allowing a special deduction' or a tax
credit' for investment in qualified pollution control equipment. Since
World War II more than 80 tax bills have been introduced in Congress
to encourage investment in pollution control equipment.'
Tax measures specifically designed for antipollution efforts had
their genesis in the federal income tax laws in 1966 with the suspension
of the seven percent investment credit. At that time an exception was
made continuing the credit during the suspension period for pollution
control facilities? In 1968, bonds for pollution control facilities were
granted an exception to the repeal of the tax-exempt status of industrial
* Assistant Professor of Law, Boston College Law School; formerly associated with
the Office of Tax Legislative Counsel, United States Treasury.
** B.S., University of Pennsylvania, 1967; J.D., Boston College, 1970; Member of
the Pennsylvania Bar; Law Clerk to Judge John Biggs, Jr., United States Court of
Appeals, Third Circuit.
1
 See, e.g., ABT Associates, Inc., Incentives to Industry for Water Pollution Con-
trol: Policy Considerations 46-47 (1967) [prepared for the Federal Water Pollution
Control Administration United States Department of the Interior, in fulfillment of
§ 18 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. 1 466n (Supp. V, 1970)].
2
 See, e.g., ABT Associates, Inc., supra note 1, at 48-50.
• Id. at 97-100.
4 See, e.g., Roberts, River Basin Authorities: A National Solution to Water Pollu-
tion, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 1527, 1538-540 (1970).
5 Id. at 1544-556.
0
 See, e.g., 116 Cong. Rec. S6380 (daily ed. April 30, 1970) (proposal of Senator
Byrd allowing an individual taxpayer to deduct from gross income the cost of eligible
pollution control equipment),
7 See, e.g., ABT Associates, Inc., supra note 1, at 41.
8
 Id. For an earlier compilation of bills 'introduced in Congress to provide tax
incentives for the Construction of air and water pollution control facilities, see 112
Cong. Rec. 7933-936 (1966).
9 Act of Nov. 8, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-800, § 1(a), 80 Stat. 1508, 1511-512, codified
in Int. Rev, Code of 1954, { 48(h)(12) (repealed).
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development bonds." Most recently, the Tax Reform Act of 1969
included a provision allowing a taxpayer to amortize over a five-year
period a portion of the cost of his investment in qualified pollution
control facilities."
This article will examine the considerations involved in using the
federal income tax system to encourage efforts to control environmental
pollution through an analysis of . the five-year rapid amortization pro-
vision of the Tax Reform Act of 1969, Section 169 of the Internal
Revenue Code. Financial assistance through the tax mechanism is an
alternative to other forms of direct federal aid. As such, the new tax
provision must be compared to these alternatives—direct grants, low
cost loans, and the like—as to equity, efficiency, and effectiveness.
II. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF SECTION 169
When President Nixon recommended repeal of the seven percent
investment tax credit in April, 1969,12 testimony by private industry
representatives before the House Ways and Means Committee sug-
gested that an exception be made for pollution abatement facilities."
It was argued that if an exception were not carved out for pollution
control facilities, many industries would find it extremely difficult to
comply with federal, state and local regulations governing air and water
pollution." Industry representatives pointed out that pollution control
facilities do not increase earnings, improve competitive position, expand
production or cut costs." They further asserted that investment in
pollution control facilities serves only a social purpose and that the
public should thus share part of the cost of the investment's Some
witnesses even suggested that the investment tax credit should be in-
creased above the seven percent rate. 17
The Treasury's and the Department of Health, Education and
10 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 103 (c) (4) (F).
11 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, 3i 169 .
12 Message from the President of the United States Regarding Tax Reform, H.R.
Doc. No. 103, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
18 See, e.g., Hearings on the President's Proposal to Repeal Investment Tax Credit
and to Extend Surcharge and Certain Excise Tax Rates Before the House Ways and
Means Comm., 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 158 (statement of Edwin A. Locke, Jr., President,
American Paper Institute) ; id. at 167 (statement of William Verity, President and Chief
Executive Officer, Armco Steel Corp.); id. at 193 (statement of Edmund F. Martin, Chair-
man and Chief Executive Officer, Bethlehem Steel Corp.).
14 Id. at 449 (statement of Representative John M. Slack); id. at 386 (statement
of Joseph E. Moody, President, National Coal Policy Conference, Inc.) ; id. at 366
(statement of J.B. Gutenkunst, President, Milwaukee Malleable and Grey Iron Works).
is Id. at 193 (statement of Edmund F. Martin).
18 Id. at 202 (statement of F. A. Fielded, CF&I Steel Corp.).
17
 Id. at 204 (statement of Waldo B. Lyden, Chairman, Tax Committee, Can
Manufacturers Institute, Inc.).
18 Id. at 24-25 (supplementary statement of Hon. David M. Kennedy, Secretary
of the Treasury).
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Welfare (HEW) 19
 opposed any exception to preserve the investment
credit for antipollution devices. The Treasury feared that opening the
door to an exception for pollution abatement facilities would invite
other exceptions, and thus erode the effectiveness of repeal of the invest-
ment credit as an anti-inflationary measure.
Former Secretary Finch of HEW, in a letter to the House Ways
and Means Committee, argued that the tax credit would not be an effec-
tive stimulus to pollution abatement.2° From the standpoint of private
industry, since the necessary equipment yields little or no return, alter-
native uses of funds would be economically more attractive even with
the seven percent tax credit. Hence, any "incentive" effect of a tax
preference was doubtful. Further, Secretary Finch argued, the prime
incentive for industry to engage in pollution abatement efforts arises
from state and local regulatory requirements. Thus the tax credit
would constitute a windfall rewarding businesses for doing what they
would have to do in any event. Under this analysis, Secretary Finch
concluded that the proposal to provide an investment credit for pollu-
tion control facilities simply amounted to cost-sharing by the federal
government. As such, the tax cost-sharing approach had to be evaluated
like any other proposed federal aid to private business from the stand-
point of need, efficiency and effectiveness.
Secretary Finch pointed out that the cost to industry of effective
pollution control is quite small. A 1967 report by an interagency
Working Committee on Economic Incentives entitled "Cost Sharing
With Industry?" concluded that the annual cost of effective air and
water pollution abatement would average less than one-third of one
percent of value-added by all manufacturing and electric power indus-
tries.21
 This relatively small cost did not appear to warrant federal cost-
sharing.
The federal subsidy through the investment credit was also con-
sidered an inefficient and, in the long run, possibly counter-productive
approach to pollution abatement. The investment credit could only be
available for investment in end-of-the-line hardware. Thus there would
be marked incentive for businesses to use hardware as a solution to
every pollution problem, precluding experimentation with changes in
fuel, processing techniques, or changes in raw materials utilization,
none of which could qualify for the federal tax cost-sharing funds.
Technically, these latter methods appear to many antipollution experts
10
 Id. at 129-30 (statement of Hon. Robert H. Finch, Secretary of HEW).
20 Id.
21
 Cost Sharing With Industry? Summary Report of the Working Committee on
Economic Incentives (Revised) 3 (Nov. 20, 1967). The Working Committee was one
of several committees under the aegis of the Federal Coordinating Committee on the
Economic Impact of Pollution Abatement.
353
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
to offer sounder long-range approaches to pollution abatement, and
Secretary Finch therefore argued that the tax credit would subsidize the
more inefficient and ineffective techniques.
Despite Treasury and HEW opposition to an investment credit,
and with no substantive supporting study, the House Ways and Means
Committee voted a special five-year rapid amortization provision for
certified pollution control facilities as a substitute for the seven percent
investment credit." Under this provision, a taxpayer could deduct the
total cost of pollution abatement equipment in five years even though
normal tax depreciation rules would establish a longer useful life for the
property. Viewed as a tax measure, the Treasury estimated that equip-
ment with a 50 year useful life would have received a tax benefit from
the new rapid write-off provision equal to a 20 percent investment
credit." Viewed as an expenditure provision, the House, in effect, pro-
posed to appropriate $400 million annually to share costs for an effort
that, from the evidence available, needed no subsidy, and for an ap-
proach which, in the view of the experts, would in the long run be inef-
fective and inefficient.
In hearings before the Senate Finance Committee on H.R. 12290,
the Treasury acquiesced rather half-heartedly in the five-year rapid
amortization provision for pollution control facilities, but suggested that
the scope of the House provision be limited in several respects.' First,
the Treasury recommended that the tax assistance not be made avail-
able to plants constructed in the future which presumably would install
antipollution control facilities under local regulatory requirements.
Second, in order to eliminate the bias in favor of property with a long
useful life, the Treasury recommended that the rapid write-off be
available only for the first 15 years of the life of any property. Finally,
the Treasury concluded that the definition of a qualified pollution
control facility should be tightened so that the tax preference would
apply only to treatment facilities which are clearly identifiable as
serving only antipollution purposes.
In later hearings on H.R. 13270 (The Tax Reform Act of 1969),
The Treasury belatedly recanted its earlier position and raised serious
doubts as to the necessity for and effectiveness of a tax incentive for
pollution control:
22 Report of the Committee on Ways and Means to accompany H.R. 12290, H.R.
Rep. No. 321, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 2, 15-16 (1969) ; Report of the Committee on Ways
and Means to accompany H.R. 13270, H.R. Rep. No. 413, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1,
196-200 (1969).
29 Hearings on H.R. 12290 Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.
62-63 (statement of Hon. David M. Kennedy).
24 Id.
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The overwhelming incentive for industrial pollution control
will continue to be governmental antipollution enforcement
action, or the threat thereof. A tax relief provision in this
setting is not an incentive so much as it is a type of cost
sharing, or more accurately, an interest-free loan, to reduce
the industrial cost of compliance with enforcement action?'
The Treasury did, however, repeat its earlier testimony that, at a
minimum, the provision should be amended to limit the write-off to the
first 15 years of the life of the facility and to restrict the write-off to
facilities installed in existing plants."
In the Senate hearings both on H.R. 12290 and H.R. 13270,
industry representatives strongly endorsed the five-year amortization
provision?' Some representatives proposed even more ambitious alter-
natives to the five-year write-off such as (1) allowing a taxpayer to use
an investment tax credit in conjunction with the rapid amortization?'
(2) giving the taxpayer the option of writing off the cost of the pollution
control facilities in a period of less than five years," (3) broadening the
category of qualified facilities to include fuel desulphurization facili-
ties,80 land" and smokestacks," and (4) eliminating the dual certifica-
•tion of state and federal agencies and vesting complete supervisory
powers in the state agencies."
28 Hearings on H.R. 13270 Before the Senate Committee on Finance, 91st Cong., 1st
Sess., pt. 1, at 621 (1969) (statement of Hon. Edwin S. Cohen, Assistant Secretary of
the Treasury for Tax Policy).
26
 Id. at 621-22.
2T See, e.g., Hearings on H.R. 12290, supra note 23, at 350 (statement of W. P.
GulLander, President of the National Association of Manufacturers).
28 Id. at 484 (statement of Edmund F. Martin); id. at 490 (statement of the Board
of Directors, Chamber of Commerce of the United States); Hearings on H.R. 13270,
supra note 25, pt. 6, at 5223 (statement of Donald H. Gleason, National Association of
Manufacturers) .
29 See, e.g., Hearings on H.R. 12290, supra note 23, at 459-60 (statement of John
R. Greenlee, Chairman, Tax Policy Committee, Tax Council); id., at 490 (statement of
Board of Directors, Chamber of Commerce of the United States); Hearings on H.R.
13270, supra note 25, pt. 2, at 1247 (statement of Lester W. Brann, Jr., Exec. V.P.,
State Chamber of Commerce); id., pt. 5, at 4723 (statement of George S. Koch, Council
of State Chambers of Commerce); id., pt. 6, at 5223 (statement of Donald H. Gleason).
so See, e.g., Hearings on H.R. 12290, supra note 23, at 468-71 (statement of Fuel
Desuiphurization, Inc.).
81
 Id. at 490 (statement of Board of Directors, Chamber of Commerce of the United
States),
82 Id. at 408-09, 411, 413-15 (testimony and statements of Herbert B. Cohn and
Maynard E. Smith on behalf of Edison Electric Institute); id. at 520-21 (statement of
John D. Hicks, Secretary and General Counsel, Duke Power Co.).
83
 Id. at 489-90 (statements of Don A. Goodall, General Manager, Legislative
Action, Chamber of Commerce of the United States and the Board of Directors,
Chamber of Commerce of the United States); id. at 527-28 (statement of John D.
Cleary, Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y.); Hearings on H.R. 13270, supra note 25, pt. 2,
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,	 III. TECHNICAL DESCRIPTION OF SECTION 169
The Senate Finance Committee voted to include a special five-
year amortization provision in the Tax Reform Act of 1969," and this
version was adopted by the conference committee." The deduction is
limited to pollution control facilities added to plants which were in
operation before January 1, 1969, and only for that proportion of the
cost of the property attributable to the first 15 years of its normal
useful life." The special deduction is allowable only for a "certified
pollution control facility," which generally is defined as depreciable
property which is a separate identifiable treatment facility used to
abate or control water or atmospheric pollution or contamination by
removing, altering, disposing or storing pollutants, contaminants,
wastes or heat, and which is appropriately certified. A building is not
a pollution control facility unless it is exclusively a treatment facility,
and a pollution control facility does not include any facility which
serves any function other than pollution abatement. Facilities which
only diffuse pollution, as distinct from abating it, do not qualify. Thus,
a smokestack on a plant the height of which was increased to disperse
pollutants over a broader area would not be a qualified pollution control
facility. Also, section 169 does not provide tax assistance for the cost of
fuel desulphurization facilities or other facilities that remove pollutants
at 1279-280 (statement of Tax Committee, Can Manufacturers Institute, Inc.); id., pt. 6,
at 5224 (statement of Donald H. Gleason).
34
 Report of the Senate Comm. on Finance to accompany H.R. 13270, S. Rep. No.
552, 9Ist Cong., 1st Sess. 248-52 (1969),
35
 Statement of the Managers on the Part of the House, Conference Rep. No. 91-782,
91st Cong., 1st Sess. 326 (1969).
86
 Where a property has a normal useful life of more than 15 years, the taxpayer,
in effect, treats his facility as if it were two separate facilities. One facility (representing
the portion of the total cost attributable to the first 15 years of useful life) is eligible
for the 5-year amortization. The other facility (the remaining cost) receives regular
depreciation based upon the entire normal useful life of the property which can be
claimed concurrently with the rapid amortization deduction. If the property has a
normal useful life of 15 years or less, the total cost of the property is eligible for the
5-year amortization.
The 60 month amortization period begins either with the month in which the facility
was completed or acquired or with the next taxable year, whichever the taxpayer elects.
The amortization deduction for any month is in lieu of the regular depreciation
deduction which is allowable for that month under §167 of the Int. Rev, Code of
1954. A taxpayer who elects the amortization deduction, however, is still eligible to
receive the additional 20% first year depreciation allowance under §179 of the Code.
However, no investment credit is available for that portion of any facility for which the
5-year amortization deduction has been elected.
The depreciation recapture rules applicable to personal property (§ 1245 of the
Code) apply to the amortization deduction. As a result, if any facility is sold or other-
wise disposed of, gain is taxable as ordinary income to the extent of the previous
amortization deductions. The depredation recapture rules applicable to real property
(§ 1250 of the Code) do not apply to the amortization deduction even if the taxpayer's
pollution control facility consists of real property which would ordinarily be subject to
§ 1250 recapture.
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from fuel, apparently because such expenditures cannot be separated
from income-producing activities.
The special deduction is available only with respect to a pollution
control facility which is certified by the appropriate state and federal
authorities." The state authority must certify to the federal authority
that the facility has been constructed or acquired in conformity with
the state program or requirements regarding the abatement or control
of water or air pollution or contamination. Then the responsibile federal
agency must certify to the Secretary of the Treasury with respect to any
pollution control facility that the facility (1) is in compliance with the
applicable regulations of federal agencies, and (2) is in furtherance of
the general policies of the United States for cooperation with the states
in the prevention and abatement of water and air pollution under the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act or the Clean Air Act, respectively.
The federal certifying authority cannot certify any facility to the extent
that it appears that the costs of the facility will be recovered over its
actual useful life by reason of profits arising from the recovery of
wastes or otherwise in the operation of the facility."
Rapid amortization is available only with respect to a facility, the
construction of which was completed by the taxpayer after 1968, or
which was acquired after 1968 if the original use commences with the
taxpayer after that time," and which is placed in service before January
1, 1975. This termination date reflects a congressional decision to review
the effectiveness and efficiency of the new tax preference before it
becomes too solidly embedded in the tax laws.
87
 In the case of water pollution, the state certifying authority means the state
water pollution control agency as defined in § 13(a) of the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 466j(a) (1964) and the federal certifying authority is the Secre-
tary of the Interior. In the case of air pollution, the state authority is the air pollution
control agency as defined in § 302(b) of the Air Quality Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1857h (b)
(1964), and the federal authority is the Secretary of HEW. An interstate agency
authorized to act in place of a state certifying authority is treated as the certifying
authority of the state.
On June 5, 1970, Secretary Hickel of the Department of the Interior issued proposed
regulations containing requirements and procedures for obtaining certifications from the
Secretary of the Interior for purposes of 1169 of the Code. 18 C.F.R. pt. 602 (1970).
98
 The report on H.R. 13270 by the Section of Taxation of the American Bar
Association recognizes a technical deficiency in the Act:
The term "profits" is not defined. Ordinarily, this would mean an excess of
receipts over expenses including an allowance for the recovery of costs in the
form of depreciation. Under this definition of "profits," costs would have to be
recovered twice to prevent certification. Also, it is not clear whether some
portion of costs could be certified if there were a partial recovery through
"profits." In any case, certification depends upon a projection of "profits"
which may not in fact be recognized.
Hearings on H.R. 13270, supra note 25, pt. 6, at 5205.
80
 Only that portion of the basis of property constructed by the taxpayer which
is properly attributable to construction after 1968 is taken into account for purposes of
the amortization deduction.
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IV. TAX EXPENDITURES AND TAX EQUITY
Although the life of section 169 is of limited duration, it is still
instructive to examine its effect upon the corporate income tax system.'°
Since the passage of the Payne-Aldrich Tariff of 1909," in which the
federal government assessed its first income tax on corporations, there
has been a continuing concern that the revenue-raising purpose of the
tax has been beclouded by the use of the tax as a device for imple-
menting other government policies.42 This concern has expressed itself
in terms of closing "loopholes," broadening the tax base and the like.
More recently a new concept has emerged which has proved to be a
highly useful tool in evaluating the impact of special tax rules from the
standpoint of tax equity and fiscal efficiency. Former Assistant Secre-
tary of the Treasury for Tax Policy Stanley S. Surrey has labeled these
rules as "tax expenditures," defining them as those "special provisions
of the federal income tax system which represent government expendi-
tures made through that system to achieve various social and economic
objectives."" Correlatively, a tax expenditure may be viewed as "an
estimate of the amount of revenue that would be raised if the tax law
conformed to an agreed model."" Tax expenditures may take the form
of deductions, credits, exclusions, exemptions, deferrals or preferential
rates. While most of the tax expenditure discussion has centered on the
individual income tax," the concept has equal• validity in analyzing the
provisions of the federal corporate income tax.
Put in its simplest terms, the tax expenditure concept views a
deduction, for example, as an imputed collection of the tax that would
have been due had the deduction not been available, with a simultaneous
appropriation of funds by the federal government to the taxpayer in the
amount of the tax saving. The tax expenditure can take the form of a
direct grant, a low-cost or interest-free loan, or interest subsidy, or any
of a variety of other direct governmental programs.
Tax expenditures, however, deviate from principles of tax fairness
4° Although § 169 theoretically applies to individuals and corporations, it will be
utilized primarily at the corporate level. It appears doubtful that the well-known
leasing transaction will lend itself readily to pollution control facilities. Accordingly,
this article will not discuss the effect of § 169 on the individual income tax.
41
 Act of Aug. 5, 1909, ch. 6, 36 Stat. 11.
42 See . generally Blum, Federal Tax Reform, Twenty Questions, 41 Taxes 672
(1963); Stone, Tax Incentives as a Solution to Urban Problems, 10 Wm. & Mary L. Rev.
647 (1969).
45 Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing Government Policy: A
Comparison With Direct Government Expenditures, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 705-06 (1970).
See also McDaniel, Alternatives to Utilization of the Federal Income Tax System to
Meet Social Problems, 11 B.C. Ind. & Cora. L. Rev. 867, 868-75 (1970).
44 Kurtz, Tax Incentives: Their Use and Misuse, U. So. Cal. Tax Inst. 1 (1968).
45
 Bittker, Accounting for Federal "Tax Subsidies" in the National Budget, 22 Nat.
Tax J. 244 (1969); Surrey and Hellmuth, The Tax Expenditure Budget—Response to
Professor Bittker, 22 Nat. Tax 3. 528 (1969).
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by exempting income from tax, by permitting excessive or accelerated
deductions, or by providing preferential rates of tax. In the corporate
area, two businesses with the same net business income will pay differing
amounts of tax if one can qualify for the special benefits accorded
through the tax expenditure. It is therefore useful to analyze the new
rapid amortization provision for pollution control facilities as a tax
expenditure, and then to project it as a direct expenditure system to
evaluate its efficiency and effectiveness. Only if such an analysis is
undertaken can one determine if the price paid in the loss of tax equity
is worth the benefits derived from effecting the federal expenditure
through the tax system.
There are several threshold factors which must be taken into ac-
count in determining whether the corporate income tax system should
be used to accomplish the major social objective of solving the air and
water pollution problem. First, a corporate income tax is successful
only to the extent that it raises revenue for the government. The
revenue raised through the corporate income tax approximates 25
percent of federal revenues." The new rapid write-off for pollution
control facilities will reduce this take by some $120 million annually
when fully effective.'
Second, although the corporate tax system does not rely on a
progressive rate structure, tax expenditures in the corporate income tax
system produce inequities just as in the individual income tax system.
In order to insure fairness in a corporate income tax system, it is
necessary that the system impose the same tax liability on corporations
with equal amounts of business net income, a concept that has a rela-
tively well-defined meaning in accounting and economic terms. The
new rapid amortization provision results in tax inequity since two firms
with the same business net income will pay different corporate income
taxes only because of the ability of one firm to use the rapid write-off.
Even though society benefits from increased antipollution efforts by
corporations, it is not necessary that tax favoritism accompany the
social reform. For example, special tax benefits generally are not pro-
vided for those businesses which must take extraordinary steps to in-
sure safe working conditions for employees. There is a further inequity
between firms having the same pollution problems but utilizing differ-
ent methods for combatting the pollution. As noted above, section 169
puts a premium on capital investment in end-of-the-line pollution
abatement facilities while offering no tax benefits for other pollution
control activities which are often less expensive and more efficient than
46
 13. 13ittker & J. Eustice, Federal Income Taxation of Corporations and Share-
holders 3 (2d ed. 1966).
47 Revenue Estimates Relating to the House, Senate, and Conference Versions of
H.R. 13270, Table 6 (1969).
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the antipollution hardware which receives the special deduction."
Thus, like all tax expenditures, the rapid write-off provision creates
differing tax results among similarly situated taxpayers on a basis
wholly apart from proper rules of accounting for the cost of producing
income.
There are also upside-down effects that result from the rapid write-
off provision. Corporations with a loss get no benefit from the special de-
duction. Thus, the Penn Central Railroad presumably will not benefit
from section 169, although it may well have a substantial need for
financial assistance to meet antipollution requirements or responsi-
bilities. Similarly, under the present rate structure, every corporation
pays a normal tax of 22 percent of its taxable income and a surtax of
26 percent of its taxable income over $25,000. 49 Thus, the special
deduction for pollution abatement facilities for a corporation in the
higher bracket is subsidized by the government to the extent of 48
percent of the cost, while an expense which qualifies as a deduction
for a corporation in the lower bracket is subsidized only to the extent
of 22 percent of the cost. In short, the corporation which presumably is
in greater need of federal financial assistance gets the least help.
V. ALTERNATIVE METHODS OF VIEWING THE RAPID
AMORTIZATION PROVISION
A. As an Investment Credit
It is helpful in analyzing the rapid amortization provision to
restructure it to conform to other types of federal financial assistance,
tax as well as nontax. Section 169 can be reconstructed as an investment
credit by determining the present value of the net additional tax saving
resulting from the rapid amortization rules above the saving realized
from normally available depreciation methods. To arrive at this figure,
the total net after tax "loss" (i.e., the increased taxes resulting from
48 Assume that Corporation A has depreciable assets which are not pollution con-
trol facilities, and, after all deductions, has taxable income of $500,000. Corporation B
has an identical cost basis in depreciable assets, part of which are certified pollution
control facilities. In the absence of the rapid amortization provision, Corporation B
would have the same taxable income as Corporation A and pay the same federal income
tax. Solely because of the special tax provision, Corporation B will now pay a lower
tax for 5 years than Corporation A.
It may be questioned whether there is any tax inequity created between invest-
ment in antipollution equipment and fuel change techniques, since the costs of fuel are
fully deductible. Hence, if Corporation A shifts to a higher cost fuel, its additional costs
are deductible as incurred. The inequity noted, however, remains. Assume Corporations
A and B each have 100 gross income, 10 annual depreciation charges, and 10 annual
fuel costs. A must meet antipollution standards by changing to a higher cost fuel, so
that annual fuel Costs are now 15. B, however, can invest 75 in 15 year useful life
property that will qualify under * 169. In the absence of 169, A and B would have
continued to pay the same tax (assuming straight-line depreciation is used by B). By
virtue of p 169, B's taxes will be less for five years. See also note 75 infra.
40 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 11.
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reduced depreciation deductions in the years following utilization of
rapid amortization) per year during the sixth year to the last year of
the property's normal useful life must be subtracted from the total net
after-tax saving per year during years one through five. The net
saving per year during years one through five is determined by sub-
tracting the value of the deduction for each year under a regular
depreciation method (double-declining balance, sum-of-the-year's
digits, or straight line) from the value of the deduction for each year
under the rapid write-off provision. The total net saving during years
one through five is then calculated by discounting the net saving for
each year at a rate of interest representing the corporation's opportunity
investment cost. The net after-tax "loss" during the sixth year to the
last year of the property's normal useful life is determined by calculat-
ing the value of the regular depreciation deduction foregone by the
taxpayer who has opted for the five-year rapid write-off method. The
total net after-tax "loss" is then derived by discounting the net "loss"
for each year at the same rate of interest used to compute the total net
savings during years one through five.
The equity issue is focused by comparing the tax credit thus com-
puted and allowed for a 48 percent bracket corporation with investment
in qualifying pollution control facilities, a 48 percent bracket corpora-
tion which takes antipollution steps that do not qualify for the federal
tax aid, and a 22 percent bracket corporation with investment in
qualifying equipment.
Example 1 in Appendix A demonstrates that the rapid write-off
provision is the equivalent of a 7.968 percent tax credit for investment
in pollution control equipment with 15 year useful life for a corpora-
tion in a 48 percent tax bracket. On the other hand, rapid amortization
will produce the equivalent of only a 3.653 percent tax credit for
investment in the same facilities by a corporation in a 22 percent tax
bracket, assuming a 10 percent discount factor in each case. And, of
course, a corporation that utilizes fuel desulphurization techniques gets
no tax credit at all.
B. As a Direct Grant Program
If section 169 were recast as a direct grant program for the
parties described in Example 1, the description of the federal loan
program would read as follows:
Every corporation that purchases a $150,000 certified
pollution control facility shall be eligible to receive a direct
grant from the federal government upon the following terms:
1. If a corporation has profits in excess of $25,000 for
the year in question, the taxpayer will receive a federal
grant of $11,952;
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2. If a corporation realizes less than $25,000 in profits
for the year in question, it will receive a federal grant of
$5,479;
3. If a corporation has no taxable income or suffers a
loss for the year in question, then it will receive no aid from
the federal government;"
4. If the corporation pursues alternative pollution con-
trol measures not involving the acquisition of pollution
abatement facilities, the government will provide no financial
assistance at all.
It is difficult to postulate a Congressman or Senator voting for a
direct grant system structured on the above model. Yet, this is, in
effect, what Congress did when it included Section 169 as part of the
Tax Reform Act of 1969.
C. As an Interest-Free Loan
Section 169 can also be viewed as an interest-free loan by the
federal government in the amount of the taxes which would have been
paid had regular depreciation been taken for tax purposes during the
five-year rapid write-off period. The loan is repaid in subsequent years
(years 6-15) when the corporation has already written off the cost of
the facility and must forego depreciation deductions to which it would
ordinarily be entitled.
Example 2 in Appendix A illustrates the amount of interest saving
that is derived from the rapid amortization provision. Again, the
upside-down effect of the tax benefit is apparent. A corporation in the
48 percent bracket is awarded a government loan that saves $24,038.70
in interest which the government foregoes to collect. But' the 22 per-
cent bracket corporation derives only $11,029.10 in interest savings
on the government loan. And, again, the government loan is simply
not available to the corporation with a net operating loss; it must go
into the regular commercial money market for funds with which to
acquire antipollution equipment.
Nor does the amount of the loan have any relation to the problem
5° Aid might be available in a subsequent year if the corporation realized profits to
correspond to tax loss carryover benefits. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 172.
When a corporation using $169 sells the pollution control facility, the total amortiza-
tion deductions which it took must be recaptured as ordinary income under $1245 of
the Code. When a corporation receiving a direct grant (as hypothesized in the text)
sells its property, the total depreciation deductions which it took, probably under the
double-declining balance method, must also be recaptured as ordinary income under
1245. If the sale takes place within 15 years of the date of purchase, less is recaptured
as ordinary income by the corporation receiving the direct grant than the corporation
using § 169, assuming both corporations sell their property at the same time, since
theoretically the government grant should be included as taxable income by the grantee.
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of pollution control or indeed to the size of the business operation,
since heavy losses could conceivably place a very large business in
the lower tax bracket. Thus, section 169 gives the least help to cor-
porations which are most in need of government aid—smaller corpora-
tions or corporations with no taxable income.
D. As a Reduction in Interest Rates on Traditional Financing
Finally, section 169 can be viewed as a federal loan program for
the full capital costs of the pollution control facilities but at interest
rates below commercial levels. Example.3 in Appendix A illustrates the
effect of recasting the five-year rapid write-off provision as a reduc-
tion in interest rates on a 100 percent mortgage at a 10 percent interest
rate for the life of the facility for a 48 percent and 22 percent bracket
corporation respectively.
This example illustrates the contours of the direct loan program
that the Departments of the Interior and HEW would be required to
ask for if they were to model it on the present tax provisions. These
Departments would be saying to Congress that they should be author-
ized to loan funds for pollution control equipment to corporations
with more than $25,000 in profits at an interest rate of 7.986 percent.
But corporations with less profit would be required to pay an interest
rate of 9.384 percent. Corporations with a loss must pay the full 10
percent interest charge.'
E. Impact of the Minimum Tax
Congress, interestingly enough, recognized the adverse impact on
tax equity of section 169 by providing that the new minimum tax be
applied to the excess of rapid amortization over other forms of
allowable depreciation." The minimum tax can thus be viewed as the
"interest" which the government is charging for its "loan."" However,
the minimum tax does not cure the inequity in section 169 for the
amount and the incidence of this tax "interest" are highly arbitrary
and erratic in operation.
If the 10 percent minimum tax is regarded as the "interest" on
the loan, the effective interest rate is substantially lower than the
market rate of interest. Example 2 in Appendix A illustrates a situa-
51
 For a similar analysis of 167k of the Code (dealing with the 5-year amortiza-
tion of rehabilitation expenses for low cost rental housing), see Hearings on H.R. 13270,
supra note 25, pt. 5, at 4906-907 (statement of Charles Davenport).
Of course, each of the programs as recast in the text will vary in amounts depend-
ing upon the actual discount factor applicable to a given corporation, the useful life of
the property involved, and its cost.
52
 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 57(a)(4). Rather curiously, the tax preference element
is apparently defined as the excess of rapid amortization over accelerated depreciation
rather than over straight-line depreciation as in the case of real estate.
ea Report of Senate Comm. on Finance, supra note 34, at 250.
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tion where neither Corporation A nor Corporation B will pay any
"interest" because the difference between the rapid amortization de-
duction and the double-declining balance deduction never exceeds the
$30,000 exemption of Section 56(a) (1) of the Code. More generally,
it is difficult to determine any rational policy behind a loan system
that imposes an interest charge on the basis of the relationship be-
tween, say, the amount of percentage depletion a taxpayer claims and
his regular taxes paid.
Even if the difference between the rapid amortization deduction
(plus other tax preferences) and the double-declining balance deduc-
tion exceeded the $30,000 exemption and income taxes for the year,
the 10 percent "interest" charge must be divided by the term of the
loan to determine the effective interest rate. Assume, for example, that
Corporation A in Example 2 has, under section 56(a) (1), other items
of tax preference, so that the net tax savings for year 1 ($4,739)
which results from using rapid amortization in lieu of double-declining
balance depreciation is subject to the 10 percent minimum tax. Hence,
the "interest" charge payable in year 1 is $473.90. This interest is all
prepaid since the loan is comprised of a $4,631 loan for five years and
a $108 loan for six years (see Chart III, Example 2). The actual annual
(1070-minimum tax)








Corporation A in the example did not incur a minimum tax until year
3, the "interest" burden would, of course, be different. But one
searches in vain for any rational explanation for the variances either
in terms of federal tax or lending policy. In any event, the minimum
tax can hardly be viewed as a rational interest increment if the rapid
amortization privilege is viewed as a government loan program.
VI. SECTION 169 AS A FORM OF FEDERAL COST SHARING
Analysis of the new rapid write-off privilege for pollution control
facilities as a tax expenditure reveals its adverse impact on tax equity
in the federal corporate income tax system, and its inherent irration-
ality when viewed as a program of direct federal financial assistance.
Nonetheless, it is necessary to explore the effectiveness and efficiency
of the section 169 mechanism in dealing with the problems of air and
water pollution. For proponents of tax expenditures argue that use of
the tax system will permit the task at hand to be attacked by private
industry more efficiently and effectively than if direct federal financing
programs are involved.
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Although the avowed purpose of section 169 is to offer private
industry an incentive to install pollution abatement equipment, it is
doubtful that this tax expenditure will stimulate such investment."
Unlike the seven percent investment tax credit which applied to profit-
making as well as non-profit-making investments, section 169 applies
only to the latter category. The statute specifically states that prop-
erty is not eligible for rapid amortization "to the extent that it appears
that by reason of profits derived through the recovery of wastes or
otherwise in the operation of such property, its costs will be recovered
over its actual useful life."" Since pollution control equipment is
generally an economic loss item, the federal tax assistance will
merely reduce the amount of the loss which would be incurred by
industry absent such assistance. Businessmen do not ordinarily invest
in unprofitable ventures regardless of the fact that losses will be
limited. In making investment decisions, businessmen usually compare
anticipated rates of return on alternative investments and choose the
project with the highest projected rate of return. Since an investment
in a "certified pollution control facility" is by definition an investment
in a venture with little or no return, it is unlikely that industrialists
not otherwise disposed toward making such an investment will be
induced to make the investment as a result of the available tax
assistance.
The only real incentives for investment in pollution control
facilities are: (1) the favorable effect which such investment should
have on public relations; (2) the avoidance of the time and money
costs of enforcement proceedings in connection with local regulations;
(3) the preservation of amicable relations with the federal, state and
local governments; and (4) the manager's personal satisfaction in
realizing that he has made a contribution toward the improvement of
environmental quality." Opposed to these incentives are three positive
reasons for industry to refuse to invest in pollution control facilities.
First, more generous direct federal aid may be available to industry
in the future if federal defense spending declines relatively and as the
pollution problem becomes more acute. Second, research presently
being done should provide the basis for pollution control strategies less
costly and more efficient than present pollution abatement methods.
Third, delay allows a firm to invest in alternative profit-making invest-
ments and to save the operating expenses which would have to be
54 For a discussion of the argument that tax incentive schemes do not provide real
incentives to change behavior, see ABT Associates, Inc., Incentives to Industry for
Water Pollution Control: Policy Considerations 41-42 (1967) Roberts, supra note 4,
at 1530-532.
55 Int. Rev. Code of 1954,	 169(e).
56 Roberts, River Basin Authorities: A National Solution to Water Pollution, 83
Harv. L. Rev. 1527, 1531 (1970).
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incurred to run and maintain pollution control facilities." Thus, the
incentive effect of section 169 is questionable at best."
The justification for the new provision must, therefore, rest on
the assertion that it is the best means of cost-sharing available. It is
necessary here to consider two preliminary questions. One, should the
public bear a significant part of the cost of industrial pollution abate-
ment? Two, is the projected cost to industry of effective pollution
control so large as to warrant additional federal cost-sharing, however
erratic?
With respect to the first question, it is clear that section 169 is
bottomed on the assumption that the public should bear a significant
share of the cost of pollution control in the form of foregone taxes.
Many economists, on the other hand, assert that the direct cost of
abating industrial pollution should largely be borne by industry. Pro-
fessor Roberts of Harvard University cogently summarizes this argu-
ment as follows:
Tax incentives are also inefficient in an economic sense
... in that they shift the cost of abatement from the polluter
and the consumers of his goods to the government. In so
doing such schemes interfere with market adjustments which
would otherwise lead to production of the "correct" bundle
of goods and services for society. For years now polluting
firms have been imposing costs on the users of streams and
rivers in the form of the wastes they add to the water. These
wastes interfere with recreation and make it unpleasant for
all who encounter the dirty water. Who benefits from this
dirty water? The answer is those individuals who purchase
the goods whose production generated the pollution, as well
as those individuals who "own" inputs (capital, land, or
labor) that have special usefulness in producing these goods.
At the moment these individuals do not pay for the "ex-
ternal" costs they impose on others. The logic of economic
efficiency indicates that in the long run consumers and pro-
ducers of pollution-creating products should pay prices that
reflect the real total costs to society of producing the goods
in question including the cost of abating their pollution.
Thus, subject to some complicated theoretical economic
qualifications, the prices of pollution-producing goods should
rise enough to cover the cost of controlling that pollution.
To the extent that tax incentives or other federal grants
57 Id. at 1530.
88 Sec p. 353 supra for a discussion of Secretary Finch's opposition to tax incentives.
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reduce the costs of pollution-producing goods, a nonoptimal
set of goods will be produced for society."
With respect to the second question, it should be noted that the
public is already providing cost-sharing benefits to industry in pro-
grams quite apart from special tax incentives through research, low
interest loans and direct grants. 8° Furthermore, as noted earlier, the
1967 federal interagency report estimated that the average additional
annual cost caused by pollution abatement is significant but relatively
small for all manufacturing firms." The report concluded that the
annual cost of effective air and water pollution abatement would be
less than one-third of one percent of value-added by all manufacturing
and electric power industries." Although the report indicates that
some industries will experience substantially higher costs, it concluded
that federal assistance on an industry-wide basis is not presently
needed. The most promising approach would appear to be a low-cost
loan program directed at particular marginal situations where the
costs of compliance with antipollution regulations produce a signifi-
cant economic hardship.
Even if one reaches the conclusion that the public should properly
bear a large part of the cost of industrial pollution abatement, and
that the cost to industry is sufficiently large as to warrant additional
federal cost-sharing, there are a number of defects in the rapid amorti-
zation provision which militate against its use.
A fundamental defect of section 169 results from the misalloca-
tion of economic resources that it produces. From the standpoint of
businessmen's decision-making, it is important that the tax system
remain neutral. The tax system violates this principle when special
benefits provide a greater after-tax rate of return for one of two pos-
sible investments solely because of the tax gain so generated. If
economic neutrality is violated, resource use will differ from that
which would result if the tax system were more nearly neutral."
Section 169 violates economic neutrality since a businessman, in
comparing two types of pollution abatement expenditures, may select
methods involving capital outlays rather than, say, more efficient use
of present facilities, solely because the tax benefit goes to the first and
69 Roberts, supra note 56, at 1535-536 (footnotes omitted).
00 For a summary of federal pollution abatement programs, see S. Degler & S. Bloom,
Federal Pollution Control Programs: Water, Air, and Solid Wastes (1969). See also Cost
Sharing with Industry?, supra note 21, at 6-11.
61 Cost Sharing with Industry?, supra note 21, at 1.
62 Id. at 3. The hypothetical standards used in the study require 85% removal of
biochemical oxygen demanding wastes and suspended solids from water and a 60% to
75% reduction of human exposure to sulphur oxides and particulate pollutants in all
Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas.
63 See generally Federal Tax Policy for Economic Growth and Stability, S. Rep. No.
1310, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1956).
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not the second type of expenditure. To the extent that the new provi-
sion induces certain types of investments it may be an inefficient
method of combatting air and water pollution. In order to qualify for
special treatment under section 169, the pollution control facility must
be a "new identifiable treatment facility which is used . . . to abate or
control water or atmospheric pollution or contamination by removing,
altering, disposing, or storing of pollutants, contaminants, wastes, or
heat. . .)764 A "new identifiable treatment facility" is further defined
as depreciable tangible property." As noted above, qualified facilities
exclude buildings and their structural components unless used ex-
clusively as a treatment facility," facilities which only disperse pollu-
tion, as opposed to facilities that abate pollution," and facilities that
remove pollutants, such as sulphur, from fuel."
Section 169 thus encourages corporations to invest in capital-
oriented projects for abating pollution, and to neglect other important
and often less costly and more efficient ways of controlling pollution.
This is a result of the fact that capital expenditures are made artifi-
cially less expensive relative to other techniques by virtue of the five-
year amortization provision. Correspondingly, the real cost of pollu-
tion control to society will be higher than it would have been without
the tax aid." For example, section 169 provides no tax advantage for
the following pollution control practices which might be less costly and
more effective than investment in "new identifiable treatment facilities":
(1) purchasing land on which to construct treatment ponds;" (2)
chemical precipitation;" (3) labor for operation and maintenance; 72
(4) labor for more careful control of production processes; 73 (5) use
of dispersion equipment such as high smokestacks;" and (6) fuel
substitution." The last alternative is the least costly method in more
" 64 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 169(d)(1).
65
 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 169(d)(4).
se Id.
67 S. Rep. No. 552, supra note 34, at 250.
08 Id.
69
 For a discussion of this point see Roberts, supra note 56, at 1532-533.
79 ABT Associates, Inc., supra nate 54, at 42-43. See also note 31 supra. There have,
however, been a few cases which have held that building the ponds themselves by
throwing up earthen dikes may be depreciated. See, e.g., Union Elec. Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 177 F.2d 269 (8th Cir. 1949) (dams); Quito Elec. Light & Power Co. 10 B.T.A.
538 (1928) (dams and canals).




 Address of Douglas B. Wilson, Tax Institute of America Symposium, Princeton,
N.J., Nov. 21, 1969. See also note 32 supra.
75 Id. The distortion effect on the businessman's decision-making process can be
illustrated as follows. Assume a business with $100 gross income, fuel costs of $10 and
depreciation of $10. The manager has a choice of increasing fuel costs to $15 per year
or of making an additional capital investment of $75 in 15 year useful life pollution
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than 50 percent of the cases involving sulphur oxide air pollution
abatement.7 °
Another important infirmity of section 169 is that it provides
little incentive for a corporation to utilize changes which add to plant
output while reducing pollution. In some industries, over 50 percent
of the lowest-cost opportunities for reducing waste load discharges are
found in such process changes.77 It is doubtful whether a facility
would qualify under section 169 if it has two functions, that is, increas-
ing output and reducing pollution. The Report of the Senate Finance
Committee states explicitly that "a pollution control facility does not
include any facility which serves any function other than pollution
abatement."" The section itself disqualifies facilities whose costs are
recovered through the sale of wastes or otherwise." It has even been
suggested that this bias in section 169 might so reduce the incentive to
use process changes that enough extra waste would be produced to
offset the increase in treatment capacity resulting from the incentive."
The tax expenditure also fails to reward economies in pollution
control which derive from regional cooperation and central treatment
facilities operated by a municipality or other government agency.
Section 169 might make it less expensive after taxes for a corporation
to invest in its own facilities rather than to have its waste treated by
a central agency, even though before taxes central treatment charges
were lower. If these charges reflect the real costs to the central agency
of treating the wastes of the plant, then more resources will have
been used than necessary to achieve the pollution control objectives of
the country.81
Yet another way in which section 169 distorts business decision-
making is its inherent bias for property having a long useful life.
Although the Conference Committee ameliorated the problem by
limiting the amortizable basis to the proportionate part of the adjusted
basis which is represented by the first 15 years of the normal useful
abatement equipment. In the absence of rapid amortization, taxable income would be
the same under either decision (assuming straight-line depreciation), and the question
would be whether it is more desirable to expend a greater sum currently to be recovered
over the life of the property or to expend a lesser sum now but with Increased fuel
costs over the next 15 years. However, the presence of § 169 distorts the decision since,
while the capital costs could now be recovered in 5 years rather than 15, the change in
fuel method will still result in increased costs for, 15 years. The discounted present cost
of each technique has now changed relatively and the manager may find it more bene-
ficial to utilize depreciable equipment than fuel changes, solely because of the tax
provision.
70 See note 74 supra.
77 Id.
78 Report of Senate Comm. on Finance, supia note 34, at 250.
79 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 169(e).
80 ABT Associates, Inc., supra note 54, at 43.
81 Roberts, supra note 56, at 1534-535.
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life of such property, it did not completely eliminate this bias. For
example, section 169 offers the greatest benefit to property with a
life of 15 years or more. It offers no benefit to property with a
life 'of five years or less. While the 15-year-life rule held down the
revenue cost of the measure, it can hardly be viewed as a rational
approach to pollution abatement.
Aside from these economic defects, there are other problems with
the approach adopted in section 169. First, the provision is inefficient
in providing tax benefits to all corporations regardless of whether the
corporation would have purchased the equipment without the tax
benefits. As mentioned earlier, the primary incentive for a manufac-
turer to install antipollution devices is not the availability of a tax
benefit, but the avoidance of local regulatory enforcement proceedings
with attendant bad publicity. Thus, section 169 gives a windfall to
corporate taxpayers for doing something that they would have done
without the tax incentive.
Section 169 is not targeted to meet priority areas. Some indus-
tries and corporations account for more pollution than others. For
example, transportation industries account for more air pollution than
manufacturing industries.82 Some cities and states are more polluted
than others. The new provision does not allow the federal government
to direct aid or assistance to priority areas. In a sense, this failure can
also be considered a misallocation of scarce resources.
One of the most critical deficiencies of section 169 is that Con-
gress has very little control over the extent and nature of the assis-
tance which it is granting. The technology of pollution abatement has
not reached the point where a definite strategy can be followed. When
this fact is considered in conjunction with the diverse pollution
problems in different localities and the various possible abatement
techniques, it is obvious that the keynote of a sound policy must be
flexibility. Unfortunately, section 169 commits the country to an
inflexible method which, because it is embedded in the tax system,
automatically affords it first priority on available government reve-
nues.
A sound pollution abatement policy must also be subject to
constant scrutiny and evaluation, so that priorities can be established
on a rational basis. The tax expenditure for industry using section
169 is not part of the federal budget and thus it is difficult for the
public to evaluate the nature and extent of the aid. 88
82 Address of Douglas B. Wilson, supra note 74.
83 One of the arguments which proponents of § 169 use is that it involves little
government supervision or "red tape." The basis for this assertion is unclear, for in
order to qualify a facility under § 169, it is necessary that the facility be certified by
the appropriate state and federal authorities. Also, government supervision can be as
tight or as loose under a tax program as under a direct expenditure program. This
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VII. POLLUTION, POLITICS AND TAX POLICY
The rapid amortization privilege for pollution control facilities
appears to be an ill-advised response to the pollution problem. As a
tax expenditure, it violates the integrity of the federal corporate
income tax system, with resultant distortions in tax equity. As a
system of federal cost sharing, it is an inefficient and ineffective
vehicle for providing federal financial assistance in the vital battle
against air and water pollution. The above analysis suggests that any
attempt to utilize the federal tax system as a means of financing the
pollution effort will suffer the same infirmities. In a time of strong
pressures on the federal budget it is therefore unfortunate that
Congress saw fit to allocate annually over $100 million—some 10
percent of the amount now directly expended for the pollution prob-
lem—of our national resources in this fashion.
But if the foregoing analysis of section 169 is correct, the ques-
tion that remains is why Congress would enact such a provision. The
answer lies in the political potency that the antipollution effort has
amassed. Senators and Representatives could not vote against a
measure that had the label "pollution control" affixed to it. Since the
Senate Finance Committee approved the provision as part of the Tax
Reform Act of 1969 there was little chance to strike the measure on
the Senate floor. Issues of tax equity, efficiency and effectiveness could
not stand up to pollution control in political terms.
Senator Gore did try to eliminate the five-year rapid write-off
from the bill." But his amendment was overwhelmingly defeated."
The problem that those concerned with tax fairness face when dealing
with a tax preference for activities that have a strong claim on the
nation's social and economic resources was exemplified by Senator
Muskie's position on the Gore amendment. Muskie consistently voted
for tax reform throughout consideration of the Tax Reform Act. But
he abandoned tax equity in favor of dollars for the antipollution
effort. In declaring his opposition to Gore's proposal to delete the
new rapid write-off provision, Muskie declared:
Mr. President, I rise to oppose that portion of the Gore
amendment which has to do with the amortization of pollu-
tion control facilities in the case of both air and water.'
As chairman of the Subcommittee on Air and Water
Pollution, I have been concerned ... with the problem of stim-
argument is really nothing more than an assertion that government supervision should
be kept at a minimum, a goal which can be reached by using either tax or direct
expenditures.
84 115 Cong. Rec. S15394-5396 (daily ed. Dec. 6, 1969).
85 115 Cong. Rec. 516207 (daily ed. Dec. 9, 1969).
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ulating the construction of waste treatment facilities in the
public sector . . . .
Although in the subcommittee we do not have jurisdic-
tion over tax legislation, the subcommittee—going back to
1966 in the report, on the 1966 Clean Water Restoration Act
—has advocated tax incentives to mount an industrial effort
comparable to the public effort. . . .
This tax relief is only a stimulation to industry to make
the investments called for by air and water quality stan-
dards."
Muskie's position on section 169 illustrates the problem that faces
those concerned with and responsible for maintenance of the integrity
of the federal income tax system each time a proposal is made to
provide a tax incentive to assist in meeting the social and economic
problems that confront our nation—whether it be education, housing,
unemployment, or some other social need. A vote against the tax pref-
erence appears to be a vote against the underlying substantive
problem. Advocates of a fair tax system thus must adequately arm
themselves with data and arguments—cast in politically persuasive
terms—to demonstrate the inadequacy of the particular tax approach
in terms of meeting the social problem itself.
VIII. THE TASK AHEAD
Congress, in enacting new section 169, placed a five-year life on
the measure to insure congressional review of the effectiveness of the
provision before it becomes a permanent aspect of the tax structure.
Although in our view the passage of the present provision was ill
advised, the provision is now in the law. The task to be undertaken in
the next five years is to develop data that can provide a basis for
congressional decision-making when section 169 is reviewed.
The first order of business is to pose the questions, the explora-
tion of which will provide Congressmen and Senators with the needed
information concerning the operation of section 169. The following
are submitted as a starting point for analysis. 87
1. What was the actual cost in revenues of the rapid write-off?
2. What portion of the actual cost of pollution control equipment
with respect to which the special deduction was claimed was repre-
sented by this federal share?
88 Id. at 16204-6205. For the full debate on the Gore amendment, see 115 Cong.
Rec. S15394-5396, 16095-6099, 16202-6207 (daily ed. Dec. 6, 8-9, 1969).
87 The authors are indebted to Professor Marc J. Roberts of Harvard University
and Professor Stanley S. Surrey of the Harvard Law School for their valuable assistance
in formulating this suggested line of questions.
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3. What corporations utilized the provision in terms of size,
financial position, industrial classification and geographical location?
4. What kinds of pollution control equipment were acquired?
In terms of antipollution technology, how did the devices compare to
other forms of pollution control measures that did not qualify for
special tax consideration?
5. Were devices qualifying for the rapid write-off installed as
the result of local, state or federal regulatory requirements? Did the
devices go beyond minimum requirements?
6. Would businesses have used alternative methods of pollution
control in the absence of the rapid write-off?
7. What amount of the rapid amortization claimed fell into the
minimum tax base?
8. In terms of cleaning up industrial pollution, is there a need
for federal financial aid? Do all corporations need the same amount
and kind of aid? All industries? Did the tax benefits go to the corpo-
rations that were found to need financial aid?
9. What part of the total air and water pollution problem is
caused by industrial pollution? Does the problem vary in different
geographical areas? What is the correlation between this data and the
answers to question 2, supra?
The above questions provide a general framework for reference.
But specific data must be acquired from industry if Congress is to
be able to evaluate section 169 prior to its expiration. Who should
collect the data? The most logical agencies would appear to be the
offices responsible for certifying to the Treasury that pollution control
equipment qualifies for the special deduction." With each application
for certification, the responsible agencies could require information
to be submitted with respect to the questions outlined above.
Specifically, information should be required with respect to each
property as to its cost, its useful life and its exact geographical loca-
tion. The company should be required to state whether it had ever
been involved with .regulatory proceedings under state or local law
concerning the particular plant, whether in the form of enforcement
proceedings or abatement conferences. Information as to the timing
of installing the equipment should be elicited, for example, the date on
which the management or the board of directors approved the facility
and the dates when the principal components were acquired. The
existence and cost of any available municipal or regional disposal
facilities should also be ascertained. Did the business consider these
alternatives and why did it reject them?
Such data would help to answer the basic question whether sec-
88 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 169(0(3); See also note 37 supra.
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tion 169 in fact operates as an incentive, whether it was effectively
utilized where the need was greatest, and whether it encourages the
most efficient utilization of resources to meet pollution problems.
Since section 169 is a tax measure it might be thought that the
Treasury and Internal Revenue Service should be the data-collecting
agencies. The agencies responsible for certification appear to be
superior collecting resources however. The issues involved in analyz-
ing section 169 are really economic and technical in nature, more
than tax. Further, reliance on the Internal Revenue Service will require
the development of considerably more sophisticated tax forms than
are now being used. For 1970, the corporate tax return, Form 1120,
simply requires a listing of the total amortization deductions claimed,"
with an explanatory schedule to be attached. It would be an arduous
task to try to locate those returns for examination and extract useful
data therefrom. If the Internal Revenue Service is to be utilized as the
data-collecting agency, Congress should specifically authorize and re-
quire the Service to act so that forms can be revised for 1971, and
thereafter to facilitate computer print outs of relevant data.
It is obvious that the necessary data is of a mixed nature. Some
of the information is purely factual—cost, useful life, and the like.
But other important information is necessary to determine business
motives and intent. It is thus essential that skilled public survey
personnel participate with economists and engineers in developing the
questionnaires.
Once the data is collected it must be analyzed. Here, Congress
should utilize outside resources, such as economists and research orga-
nizations concentrating on the pollution problem, as well as govern-
ment agencies such as Treasury, HEW, Interior and the Office of
Management and Budget.
The importance of establishing criteria now for evaluating section
169 cannot be overstated. It will be too late if we wait until 1974. And
it would be singularly unfortunate if section 169 is reviewed in the
data vacuum that existed during its passage in 1969. In the absence
of concrete data and informed evaluation thereof, the congressional
policy-makers will be able to do little more than weigh the politics of
pollution against tax equity, without any real basis for informed
judgment as to whether the price paid in tax fairness was worth the
benefits derived in terms of greater pollution control.
89 Form 1120, line 20, simply requires a total of all amortization deductions claimed.
Thus, this figure will include deductions for exploration and development expenditures
(§§ 615-617), research or experimental expenditures (§ 174), trademark and tradename
expenditures (§ 177), certified coal mine safety equipment (§ 187), and railroad rolling
stock (§ 184). Hence, the task of extracting the necessary information from present tax
returns would be extremely difficult and laborious.
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1. Property with cost of $150,000 purchased on the first day of the
tax year.
2. Discount rate of ten percent.
3. Normal useful life of property is 15 years with no salvage value.
4. Corporation A is in the 48 percent tax bracket while Corporation
B is in the 22 percent tax bracket.
5. Neither Corporation A nor Corporation B is subject to the 10 per-
cent minimum tax on tax preferences."
6. Corporations A and B have both elected to take an additional first
year 20 percent depreciation deduction."
7. Both Corporation A and Corporation B would have used double-
declining balance method of computing depreciation if they had not
opted for utilization of five-year amortization."
8. The tax surcharge on corporate income has been disregarded."
Corporation A





 Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 301, 1 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News 623-30 (1969) (codified at Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 56-58). This section imposes
a 10% tax on certain tax preference items including the difference between the rapid
amortization deduction and the deduction otherwise allowable under § 167 of the Code.
In figuring the 10% minimum tax, the total of tax preference items must be reduced by
a $30,000 exemption and by the normal income tax for the year in question.
91
 Under § 179 of the Code, any taxpayer may elect to write off 20% of the cost
or portion of the cost of tangible personal property for the first taxable year for which
a depreciation deduction is allowable to the taxpayer, in addition to the regular
depreciation on the balance. A taxpayer who elects the five-year rapid write-off for
pollution control equipment is also eligible for the additional 20% depreciation deduc-
tion. The additional 20% allowance applies to tangible personal property to the extent
of $10,000 of cost or portion of the cost with a remaining useful life of at least 6 years.
The additional depleciation is computed on the basis of the cost of the property without
reduction for salvage value. The remaining cost, after reduction of the additional first
year depreciation and salvage value, may be depreciated under the straight-line, double-
declining balance, sum-of-the-years digits, or any other method of depreciation allowable
under § 167 of the Code.
92
 Under § 167 of the Code a taxpayer may elect to depreciate tangible personal
property by using the straight-line, double-declining balance or sum-of-the-years digits
methods. Under the double-declining balance method, depreciation is assumed to be
greatest in the first year and smaller in each succeeding year. The depreciation basis is
reduced each year by the amount of the depreciation deduction and a uniform rate
equal to 200% of the straight-line rate is applied to the resulting balances.
99
 The Tax Reform Act of 1969 extended the tax surcharge until June 30, 1970 at
a 5% annual rate for corporations. Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 701, 1 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News 717-20 (1969) (codified at Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 51(a)).
u4 The total depreciation deduction for year 1 of $21,728 includes the first year
additional 20% deduction of the first $10,000 in cost of the property.
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II. Value of the Depreciation Deduction for Years 1-5:
Year 1 ($21,728) (.48) = $10,429
Year 2 ( 17,099) (.48) = 8,208
Year 3 ( 14,819) (.48) = 7,113
Year 4 ( 12,844) (.48) = 6,165
Year 5 ( 11,132) (.48) = 5,343







IV. Value of the Amortization Deduction Under Section 169 for
Years 1-5:
Year 1 ($31,600) (.48) = $15,168
Year 2 ( 29,600) (.48) = 14,208
Year 3 ( 29,600) (.48) = 14,208
Year 4 ( 29,600) (.48) = 14,208
Year 5 ( 29,600) (.48) = 14,208
V. Net Savings Per Year During Years 1-5 Using Rapid Amor-
tization in Lieu of Regular Depreciation:
Year 1 $15,168 minus $10,429 = $ 4,739
Year 2 14,208 minus	 8,208 = 6,000
Year 3 14,208 minus 7,113 = 7,095
Year 4 14,208 minus 6,165 = 8,043
Year 5 14,208 minus 5,343 = 8,865
VI. Present Value of Net Savings Per Year During Years 1-5 Using
Rapid Amortization in Lieu of Regular Depreciation:
Year 1 ($4,739) (.909) = $ 4,308
Year 2 ( 6,000) (.826) = 4,956
Year 3 (	 7,095) (.751) = 5,328
Year 4 ( 8,043) (.683) = 5,493
Year 5 ( 8,865) (.621) = 5,505
Total Savings $25,590
95 The amount of the amortization deduction for each year is calculated by divid-
ing the total cost less the additional first year depreciation by five.
96 The first year depreciation deduction of $31,600 includes $2,000 of additional
first year depreciation (20% of $10,000).
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VII. Double-Declining Balance Depreciation for Years 6-15 (if sec-
tion 169 had not been used):










VIII.	 Value of the
reduction in 1
section 169):
Depreciation Deduction for Years 6-15 	 (net
oss of depreciation deduction per year by using
Year 6 ($9,648) (.48) = $ 4,631
Year 7 ( 8,362) (.48) = 4,014
Year 8 ( 7,257) (.48) = 3,483
Year 9 ( 6,730) (.48) = 3,230
Year 10 ( 6,730) (.48) = 3,230
Year 11 ( 6,730) (.48) = 3,230
Year 12 ( 6,730) (.48) = 3,230
Year 13 ( 6,730) (.48) = 3,230
Year 14 ( 6,730) (.48) = 3,230
Year 15 ( 6,731) (.48) = 3,230
IX. Present Value of Net Loss of Depreciation Deduction Per Year
During Years 6-15:
Year 6
	 ($4,630(.564) = $ 2,616
Year 7
	 ( 4,014) (.513) = 2,059
Year 8
	 ( 3,483) (.467) = 1,627
Year 9	 ( 3,230) (.424) = 1,370
Year 10
	 ( 3,230) (.386) = 1,247
Year 11
	 ( 3,230) (.320) = 1,131
Year 12
	 ( 3,230) (.319) = 1,030
Year 13	 ( 3,230) (.290) =	 937
Year 14
	 ( 3,230)(.263) =	 849
Year 15
	 ( 3,230) (.239) = 	772 
Total Net Loss $13,638
07 Under § 167(e)(1) of the Code, a taxpayer may at any time elect to change
his depreciation method from double-declining balance to straight-line. This election
usually occurs in the year in which the amount of the deduction under double-declining
balance is less than the amount that could be deducted if the adjusted basis were de-
preciated using the straight-line method for the remaining useful life. In the hypothetical
example, the election would occur in year 9.
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X. Present Value of Using Rapid Amortization in Lieu of Regular
Depreciation:
$25,590 minus 13,638 = $11,952














II. Value of the Depreciation Deduction for Years 1-5:
Year I	 ($21,728) (.22) = $ 4,780
Year 2
	 ( 17,099)(.22) = 3,762
Year 3	 ( 14,819)(.22) = 3,260
Year 4	 ( 12,844)(.22) = 2,826
Year 5	 ( 11,132)(.22) = 2,449



















Amortization Deduction Under Section 169 for
($31,600) (.22) = $ 6,952
( 29,600) (.22) = 6,512
( 29,600) (.22) = 6,512
( 29,600) (.22) = 6,512
( 29,600) (.22) = 6,512
V. Net Savings Per Year During Years 1-5 Using Rapid Amorti-






$6,952 minus $4,780 = $ 2,172
6,512 minus 3,762 = 2,750
6,512 minus 3,260 = 3,252
6,512 minus 2,826 = 3,686
6,512 minus 2,449 = 4,063
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VI. Present Value of Net Savings Per Year During Years 1-5
Using Rapid Amortization in Lieu of Regular Depreciation:
Year 1 ($2,172) (.909) = $ 1,974
Year 2 ( 2,750) (.826) = 2,272
Year 3 ( 3,252) (.751) = 2,442
Year 4 ( 3,686)(.683) = 2,518
Year 5 ( 4,063) (.621) = 2,523
Total Savings $11,729
VII. Double Declining Balance Depreciation for Years 6-15 	 (if
section 169 had not been used):










VIII. Value of Depreciation Deduction for Years 6-15 (net reduction
in loss of depreciation deduction per year by using section
169):
Year 6 ($9,648) (.22) = $ 2,123
Year 7 ( 8,362) (.22) = 1,840
Year 8 ( 7,257) (.22) = 1,597
Year 9 ( 6,730) (.22) = 1,481
Year 10 ( 6,730) (.22) = 1,481
Year 11 ( 6,730) (.22) = 1,481
Year 12 ( 6,730) (.22) = 1,481
Year 13 ( 6,730) (.22) = 1,481
Year 14 ( 6,730) (.22) = 1,481
Year 15 ( 6,730) (.22) = 1,481
IX. Present Value of Net Loss of Depreciation Deduction Per
Year During Years 6-15:
Year 6 ($2,123) (.564) = $ 1,197
Year 7 (	 1,840) (.513) = 944
Year 8 (	 1,597) (.467) = 746
Year 9 (	 1,481) (.424) = 628
Year 10 (	 1,481) (.386) = 572
Year 11 (	 1,481) (.350) = 518
Year 12 (	 1,481) (.319) = 472
Year 13 (	 1,481) (.290) = 429
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Year 14
	 ( 1,481) (.263) =
	 390
Year 15
	 ( 1,481) (.239) = 
	
354
Total Net Loss $ 6,250
X. Present Value of Using Rapid Amortization in Lieu of Regu-
lar Depreciation:
$11,729 minus $6,250 = $ 5,479




1. Property with cost of $150,000 purchased on the first day of the
tax year.
2. Market rate of interest at 10 percent.
3. Corporation A is in the 48 percent tax bracket while Corporation B
is in the 22 percent tax bracket.
4. Neither Corporation A nor Corporation B is subject to the 10 per-
cent minimum tax on tax preferences.
5. Normal useful life of property is 15 years with no salvage value.
6. Corporations A and B have both elected to take an additional first-
year 20 percent depreciation deduction.
7. Both Corporation A and Corporation B would have used the
double-declining balance method of computing depreciation if they
had not opted for utilization of five-year write-off.
8. The tax surcharge on corporate income has been disregarded.
Corporation A
I. Net Tax Savings Per Year During Years 1-5 Using Rapid Amor-
tization in Lieu of Regular Depreciation—Amount of Loan:° 8






II. Net Tax Loss Per Year During Years 6-15 Using Rapid Amor-
tization in Lieu of Regular Depreciation—Repayment of
Loan:"
Year 6	 $ 4,631
98 These figures appear on p. 376 supra (Corporation A, V).
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III. Interest Saved on Loan or Deferral of Tax Liability:
1. $ 4,631 for 5 years = $ 2,315.50
2. 108 for 6 years = 64.80
3. 3',906 for 5 years = 1,953.00
4. 2,094 for 6 years = 1,238.40
5. 1,389 for 5 years = 694.50
6. 3,230 for 6 years = 1,938.00
7. 2,476 for 7 years = 1,733.20
8. 754 for 6 years = 452.40
9. 3,230 for 7 years = 2,261.00
10. 3,230 for 8 years = 2,584.00
11. 829 for 9 years = 746.10
12. 2,401 for 8 years = 1,920.80
13. 3,230 for 9 years = 2,907.00
14. 3,230 for 10 years = 3,230.00
Total Interest Saved $24,038.70
Corporation B
I. Net Tax Savings Per Year During Years 1-5 Using Rapid Amor-
tization in Lieu of Regular Depreciation—Amount of Loan: 1'






II. Net Tax Loss Per Year During Years 6-15 Using Rapid Amor-
tization in Lieu of Regular Depreciation—Repayment of
Loan: 1"
Year 6	 $ 2,123
Year 7	 1,840
too These figures appear on p. 378 supra (Corporation B, V).
101 These figures appear on p. 379 supra (Corporation B, VIII).
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Total Repayment $15,927 
III. Interest Saved on Loan or Deferral of Tax Liability:
1. $ 2,123 for 5 years = $ 1,061.50
2. 49 for 6 years = 29.40
3. 1,791 for 5 years = 895.50
4. 959 for 6• years = 575.40
5. 638 for 5 years = 319.00
6. 1,481 for 6 years = 888.60
7. 1,133 for 7 years = 793.10
8. 348 for 6 years = 208.80
9. 1,481 for 7 years = 1,036.70
10. 1,481 for 8 years = 1,184.80
11. 376 for 9 years = 338.40
12. 1,105	 for 8 years = 884.00
13. 1,481 for 9 years = 1,332.90
14. 1,481 for 10 years = 1,481.00
Total Interest Saved $11,029.10
Example 3
Assumptions:
1.. Property with cost of $150,000 purchased on the first day of the
tax year.
2. Discount Rate of 10 percent.
3. Normal useful life of property is 15 years with no salvage value.
4. Corporation A is in the 48 percent tax bracket while Corporation
B is in the 22 percent tax bracket.
5. Neither Corporation A nor Corporation B is subject to the 10
percent minimum tax on tax preferences.
6. Corporations A and B have both elected to take an additional first-
year 20 percent depreciation deduction.
7. Both Corporation A and Corporation B would have used the
double-declining balance method of computing depreciation if they
had not opted for utilization of five-year amortization.
8. The tax surcharge on corporate income has been disregarded.
9: Market rate of interest is 10 percent.
10. The loan is for $150,000:.-the cost of the equipment.
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11. The term of the loan is 15 years—the normal useful life of the
equipment.
12. X= Reduction in the rate of interest.
Corporation A
I. Interest Cost Per Year:
($150,000) (10%) = $15,000
II. Tax Savings Per Year Through Deducting Interest Cost:
($15,000) (48%) = $7,200
III. Net After-Tax Interest Cost:
$15,000 minus $7,200 = $7,800
IV. Present Value of Net After-Tax Interest Cost:
Year 1 ($7,800) (.909) =$ 7,090
Year 2 ( 7,800)(.826) = 6,443
Year 3 ( 7,800) (.751) = 5,858
Year 4 ( 7,800)(.683) = 5,327
Year 5 (	 7,800)(.621) = 4,844
Year 6 (	 7,800)(.564) = 4,399
Year 7 (	 7,800)(.513) = 4,001
Year 8 ( 7,800) (.467) = 3,643
Year 9 ( 7,800)(.424) = 3,307
Year 10 ( 7,800)(.386) = 3,011
Year 11 ( .7,800)(.350) = 2,730
Year 12 (	 7,800)(.319) = 2,488
Year 13 (	 7,800)(.290) = 2,262
Year 14 (	 7,800)(.263) = 2,051
Year 15 ( 7,800) (.239) = 1,864
Total $59,318
Present Value of Using Rapid Amortization in Lieu of Regu-
lar Depreciation:
$11,952 1"
Present Value of Net After-Tax Interest Cost at Reduced
Rate of Interest:
$59,318 minus $11,952 = $47,366.
Interest Cost Per Year at Reduced Rate of Interest:
($150,000) (.10 — X) = $15,000-150,000 X
Tax Savings Per Year Through Deducting the Interest at the
Reduced Rate:
(15,000 — 150,000 X)(.48) = 7,200-72,000 X
los See p. 378 supra (Corporation A, X).
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IX. Net After-Tax Interest Cost at the Reduced Rate of Interest:
15,000-150,000 X - [7,200-72,000 X] = 15,000-150,000 X -
7,200 + 72,000 X = 7,800-78,000 X
X. Present Value of Net After-Tax Interest Cost at Reduced
Rate of Interest:
Year 1-(.909) (7,800-78,000 X) = 7,090- 70,900 X
Year 2-(.826)(7,800-78,000 X) = 6,443- 64,430 X
Year 3-(.751)(7,800-78,000 X) = 5,858- 58,580 X
Year 4-(.683)(7,800-78,000 X) = 5,327- 53,270 X
Year 5-( .621) (7,800-78,000 X) = 4,844- 48,440 X
Year 6-(.564)(7,800-78,000 X) = 4,399- 43,990 X
Year 7-(.513)(7,800-78,000 X) = 4,001- 40,010 X
Year 8-(.467)(7,800-78,000 X) = 3,643- 36,430 X
Year 9-(.424)(7,800-78,000 X) = 3,307- 33,070 X
Year 10-(.386)(7,800-78,000 X) = 3,011- 30,110 X
Year 11-(.350) (7,800-78,000 X) = 2,730- 27,300 X
Year 12-(.319)(7,800-78,000 X) = 2,488- 24,880 X
Year 13--(.290)(7,800-78,000 X) = 2,262- 22,620 X
Year 14-(.263)(7,700-78,000 X) = 2,051- 20,510 X
Year 15-(.239)(7,800-78,000 X) =  1,864- 18,640 X
Total	 59,318-593,180 X
XI. Section 169 Recast as a Reduction in Interest Cost:
59,318-593,180 X =	 47,366
-593,180 X = - 11,952
X= - 11,952 
-593,180
X = 2.014%
10% - 2.014% = 7.986%
Corporation B
I. Interest Cost Per Year:
($150,000) (10%) = $15,000
II. Tax Savings Per Year Through Deducting Interest Cost:
($15,000)(22%) = $3,300
III. Net After-Tax Interest Cost:
$15,000 minus $3,300 = $11,700
IV. Present Value of Net After-Tax Interest Cost:
Year 1	 ($11,700)(.909) = $10,635
Year 2	 ( 11,700) (.826) = 9,664
Year 3	 ( 11,700) (.751) = 8,787
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Year 4 ( 11,700)(.683) = 7,991
Year 5 ( 11,700)(.621) = 7,266
Year 6 ( 11,700)(.564) = 6,599
Year 7 ( 11,700)(.513) = 6,002
Year 8 ( 11,700)(.467) = 5,464
Year 9 ( 11,700)(.424) = 4,961
Year 10 ( 11,700) (.386) = 4,516
Year 11 ( 11,700)(.350) = 4,095
Year 12 ( 11,700)(.319) = 3,732
Year 13 ( 11,700)(.290) = 3,393
Year 14 ( 11,700)(.263) = 3,077
Year 15 ( 11,700)(.239) = 2,796
Total $88,978
V. Present Value of Using Rapid Amortization in Lieu of Regu-
lar Depreciation:
$5,479 1"
VI. Present Value of Net After-Tax Interest Cost at Reduced
Rate of Interest:
$88,978 minus $5,479 = $83,499
VII. Interest Cost Per Year at Reduced Rate of Interest:
($150,000)(.10-X) = 15,000-150,000 X
VIII. Tax Savings Per Year Through Deducting the Interest at the
Reduced Rate:
(15,000-150,000 X) (.22) = 3,300-33,000 X)
IX. Net After-Tax Interest Cost at the Reduced Rate of Interest:
15,000-150,000 X — [3,300-33,000 X] = 15,000-150,000 X
—3,300 +33,000 X = 11,700-117,000 X
X. Present Value of Net After-Tax Interest Cost at Reduced
Rate of Interest:
Year 1—(.909)(11,700-117,000 X) = 10,635-106,350 X
Year 2—(.826)(11,700-117,000 X) = 9,664- 96,640 X
Year 3—(.751)(11,700-117,000 X) = 8,787- 87,870 X
Year 4—(.683)(11,700-117,000 X) = 7,991- 79,910 X
Year 5—(.621)(11,700-117,000 X) = 7,266- 72,660 X
Year 6—(.564)(11,700-117,000 X) = 6,599- 65,990 X
Year 7—(.513)(11,700-117,000 X) = 6,002- 60,020 X
Year 8—(.467) (11,700-117,000 X) = 5,464- 54,640 X
Year 9—(.424)(11,700-117,000 X) = 4,961- 49,610 X
Year 10—(.386)(11,700-117,000 X) = 4,516- 45,160 X
loa See p. 380 supra (Corporation B, X).
38S
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
Year 11—(.350)(11,700-117,000 X) = 4,095- 40,950 X
Year 12—(.319)(11,700-117,000 X) = 3,732- 37,320 X
Year 13—(.290)(11,700-117,000 X) = 3,393- 33,930 X
Year 14—(.263) (11,700-117,000 X) = 3,077- 30,770 X
Year 15—(.239)(11,700-117,000 X) =  2,796- 27,960 X
Total 88,978-889,780 X
XI. Section 169 Recast as a Reduction in Interest Cost:






10% —.616% = 9.384%
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